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TESTING THE CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY
OF LAND USE REGULATIONS: SUBSTANTIVE
DUE PROCESS AS A SUPERIOR
ALTERNATIVE TO TAKINGS ANALYSIS
Two clauses of the United States Constitution figure most prominently
in the debate over the constitutional limits on the governmental power to
regulate land. They are the just compensation clause of the fifth amend-
ment' and the due process clause of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. 2
Neither the courts nor the commentators agree, however, on which provi-
sion to apply. Courts frequently confuse and blend the distinct concepts
of: (1) taking property without payment of just compensation, and (2)
depriving a person of property without due process of law.3 This confu-
sion has resulted in disparate results as well as in conflicting analysis. 4 A
particular regulation might be ruled a "regulatory taking" in one state,
struck down as a denial of due process in another, and upheld as a valid
police regulation in a third. 5
1. "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S.
CONsT. amend. V. The fifth amendment takings clause applies to the states through incorporation
into the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v.
Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 160 (1980); Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226
(1897). Therefore, to speak, as many courts do, of a "taking without due process" is literally accu-
rate because of this incorporation. But it cannot excuse the blending of due process and takings that
has been endemic in land use cases. The specific constitutional guarantees maintain their separate
contours when they are incorporated into the "life," "liberty," or "property" protected by the four-
teenth amendment. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
2. "[N]or shall any state deprive any person of . . . property, without due process of
law .... ." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The fifth amendment, which applies solely to the fed-
eral government, contains almost identical language. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
3. This blending was recognized by the court in Smoke Rise, Inc. v. Washington Suburban Sani-
tary Comm'n, 400 F. Supp. 1369 (D. Md. 1975).
At the outset, it is important to make a distinction which has been totally overlooked in the
pleadings of this case. . . . The fifth amendment employs two independent clauses to address
two independent issues. Contrary to the allegations of the amended complaint, a claim of depri-
vation of property without due process cannot be blended as one and the same with the claim that
property has been taken for public use, without just compensation.
400 F. Supp. at 1381. See also D. GODSCHALK, D. BROWER, L. McBENNETr & B. VESTAL, CONSTI-
TUTIONAL ISSUES OF GROWTH MANAGEMENT 53-54 (1977).
4. B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 8 (1977). Professor Ackerman
states that "in many conversations on the subject [of the takings clause] I have not encountered a
single lawyer, judge, or scholar who views existing case-law as anything but a chaos of confused
argument which ought to be set right if one only knew how." See also Oakes, "Property Rights" in
ConstitutionalAnalysis Today, 56 WASH. L. REV. 583, 607 (1981).
5. A good example of the disparate approaches that state courts use to judge the constitutionality
of land use regulations is found in the area of wetland regulation. Compare State v. Johnson, 265
A.2d 711 (Me. 1970) (wetland regulation held "unreasonable" and therefore a due process violation)
and Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 40 N.J. 539, 193
A.2d 232 (1963) (wetland regulation held a taking) with Potomac Sand & Gravel Co. v. Governor of
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The blending of these clauses has largely occurred under the label of
"regulatory takings." 6 Courts have enlarged the fifth amendment test for
determining whether a regulation is a taking to include many concepts
deriving from due process restrictions on the police power. 7 The use of
the inclusive "regulatory takings" label discourages analysis of whether
the just compensation clause actually applies to limit land use regula-
tions. 8 Some writers argue persuasively that the takings clause applies to
few, if any, land use regulations. 9 This Comment does not attempt to
Maryland, 266 Md. 358, 293 A.2d 241, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1040 (1972) (similar regulation
upheld against taking and due process challenges) and Just v. Marinette County. 56 Wis. 2d 7. 201
N.W.2d 761 (1972) (same).
6. The term "regulatory takings," strictly defined, refers to regulations that so significantly re-
strict the owner's property interest that a court will declare that there has been a de facto exercise of
eminent domain without compensation. As will be demonstrated, however, courts and commentators
have used this term very loosely to denote any claimed constitutional violation based on an exces-
sively restrictive regulation.
7. See part IliA infra.
8. See, e.g., Seigan, Editor's Introduction to PLANNING WITHOUT PRICES at I, (1977). Professor
Seigan believes that the takings clause provides the only safeguard against governmental deprivation
of private property rights through excessively restrictive land use regulations. He claims that the
theory that police power regulations are never takings "would render largely ineffective the constitu-
tional safeguard for property ownership. It would allow government to reduce through regulation the
prerogatives of ownership until the owner's interest were reduced to the virtual scrap of a naked
title." Id. at 4. This argument fails to allow a proper place for the operation of substantive due
process as a valid alternative to the use of the takings clause in these cases. As Professor Cunningham
notes, "[dlespite chronic confusion in judicial language in cases where zoning or other land use
regulations are challenged . . . . it is clear that such regulations may be held invalid on substantive
due process grounds without a finding that they amount to a defacto taking .... ." Cunningham,
Inverse Condemnation as a Remedy for "Regulatory
, 
Takings," 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 517, 518
(1981).
9. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 417 (1922) (Brandeis, J., dissenting): F.
BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE [hereinafter cited as THE TAKING ISSUE]
238-55 (1973); Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 63 (1964); Stoebuck. Police
Power, Takings, and Due Process, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1057, 1091-93 (1980). Professors Sax
and Stoebuck have independently developed a thesis that is particularly convincing. Professor Sax
argued that the test for taking must include a showing that some governmental entity will benefit
directly from the regulation. He believed that the primary justification for the takings clause was the
fear of government using the power of eminent domain as a tool to tyrannize. Therefore, Sax stated
that there should be a taking only when the government is seen as enriching itself at private expense.
This theory was incorporated into the opinion of the New York court in Fred F. French Investing Co.
v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d 381, 384, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, cert. denied, 429 U.S.
990 (1976). The Fred F. French court stated, "[wihere government acts in its enterprise capacity. as
where it takes land to widen a road, there is a compensable taking. Where government acts in its
arbitral capacity, as where it legislates zoning or provides the machinery to enjoin noxious use, there
is simply noncompensable regulation." Professor Sax has since repudiated his theory. Sax, Takings,
Private Properx
, 
and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971). Nevertheless, the first article has
remained very influential in the courts.
Professor Stoebuck proposes a test for regulatory takings which has a different theoretical founda-
tion but the same practical consequences as Professor Sax's first test. Professor Stoebuck argues that
courts should focus on the difference between a deprivation of property, where the owner loses some
valuable right but no public entity acquires it, and a literal "taking," where the property right is
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duplicate their scholarship. Instead, it attempts to show that the due pro-
cess test provides a better, more encompassing approach for judging the
constitutionality of land use regulations.
The blending of substantive due process and takings might be, an aca-
demic concern if the sole remedy granted for either provision were the
same: invalidation of the ordinance. 10 But there is a growing trend to rem-
edy regulatory takings in the same way as other takings and to require that
the government compensate the owner for lost value during the time that
the regulation remained in effect."I This trend emphasizes the need for
courts to label correctly the tests that they use and to avoid blending ele-
ments from different tests. 12
appropriated for governmental use. Both Sax's and Stoebuck's tests limit "regulatory takings" to
situations where some public body stands to gain directly from the regulation. For example, if a port
authority zones land around an airport for low intensity uses to avoid conflicts with residential neigh-
bors, the development potential of the land is being directly appropriated by the government for its
benefit. Both Sax and Stoebuck would find a taking in this situation. In the more typical situation,
where the public benefits from regulation are diffusely shared by the citizens of the community, no
taking claim would be available under either theory.
10. Due process violations in the context of land use regulations are ordinarily remedied by in-
validating the regulation. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Nectow
v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928); Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 39
N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d 381, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 990 (1976). See generally
Mandelker, Land Use Takings: The Compensation Issue, 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 491,508 (1981).
The same remedy has been followed traditionally for land use takings. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); Arverne Bay Construction Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 15
N.E.2d 587 (1938); Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills,
40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963).
11. See San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 636-661 (1981) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting); Burrows v. City of Keene, 121 N.H. 590, 432 A.2d 15 (1981). Justice Bren-
nan's dissenting opinion in San Diego Gas is especially noteworthy. Although he spoke for a minor-
ity of four justices, the majority did not reach the merits and Justice Rehnquist, concurring
separately, stated that he "would have little difficulty in agreeing with much of what is said in the
dissenting opinion." Id. at 633-34. Therefore Justice Brennan's sentiments seem to have the agree-
ment of a majority of the court as it was then composed (Justice Stewart, who joined Brennan's
opinion, has since been replaced by Justice O'Connor).
Justice Brennan's opinion in San Diego Gas strongly supports the idea that regulatory takings
should be remedied by compensation to the landowner. He stated:
The constitutional rule I propose requires that, once a court finds that a police power regulation
has effected a 'taking,' the government entity must pay just compensation for the period com-
mencing on the date the regulation first effected the 'taking,' and ending on the date the govern-
ment entity chooses to rescind or otherwise amend the regulation.
Id. at 658.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court in Burrows discussed and followed Justice Brennan's opin-
ion, although it claimed to reach its decision solely on the basis of the New Hampshire Constitution.
432 A.2d at 19-22.
12. See Comment, Balancing Private Loss Against Public Gain to Test for a Violation of Due
Process or a Taking Without Just Compensation, 54 WASH. L. REv. 315, 326 (1979). The author
asked:
Does it matter that the limitations are often merged? One might argue that, as long as all the
relevant tests for both limitations are applied, the proper finding on the question of constitution-
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This Comment has three aims. First, it traces the history of substantive
due process and regulatory takings to show how the courts have unwit-
tingly interwoven strands from the two doctrines. Second, this Comment
demonstrates that the underlying theory of each test requires that each be
kept separate and distinct from the other. Last, the Comment shows that
because the substantive due process test offers greater flexibility than the
takings test it is a superior tool for evaluating the constitutionality of land
use regulations.
I. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
A. The Origins of Substantive Due Process
The Supreme Court first used the due process clause to examine the
substance of a regulation in Mugler v. Kansas.1 3 In this 1887 case, the
Court considered a brewery owner's challenge to a state law prohibiting
the manufacture of alcohol. The first Justice Harlan, writing for the ma-
jority, examined the substance of the regulation to determine whether (1)
it had a "real or substantial relation" to a public purpose, or (2) it was a
''palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental laws.'' 14 The
Court concluded that the law was within the state's inherent power to
prohibit "noxious uses" and rejected the challenge.
The Court applied the substantive due process test again in Lawton v.
Steele. 15 The Court considered a challenge to a law that allowed state
agents to seize the equipment of people caught violating fishing regula-
tions. It rejected the challenge, but it again stated that the due process
clause requires substantive as well as procedural fairness. In a classic
summation of substantive due process, the Court said:
To justify the state in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it
must appear-First, that the interests of the public generally, as distin-
guished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and, sec-
ond, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. 16
ality will always be reached. This is true, but the possible remedies for the two constitutional
violations are not the same. A taking without compensation can be corrected by payment, but a
government action that is arbitrary or serves no valid public purpose must be voided.
Id.
13. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
14. Id. at 661. Justice Harlan stated: '[tihe courts are not bound by mere forms, nor are they to
be misled by mere pretenses. They are at liberty-indeed, are under a solemn duty-to look at the
substance of things, whenever they enter upon the inquiry whether the Legislature has transcended
the limits of its authority." Id.
15. 152 U.S. 133 (1894).
16. Id. at 137. The United States Supreme Court quoted this passage as "still valid today" in
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This two-part test 17 embodies the familiar due process ends-means analy-
sis of legislation to determine its overall reasonableness. Legislation must
both (1) be aimed at achieving some public purpose, and (2) use means
that are reasonably suited to achieving that purpose.
B. Substantive Due Process in the Context of Land Use Controls
The Supreme Court has used the substantive due process standard to
judge the validity of land use controls. For example, in Hadacheck v.
Sebastion, 18 the Court upheld a Los Angeles ordinance prohibiting brick
manufacture despite the plaintiff's claim that the ban uniquely and uncon-
stitutionally deprived him of the profitable use of his brickyard. The
Court stated that there was a public purpose, based on the city's desire to
prevent a nuisance such as the brickyard from existing in growing resi-
dential areas, and held that the ordinance used reasonable means to
achieve that purpose. 19
The Court used the substantive due process test again in Village of Eu-
clid v. Ambler Realty Co., 20 where it established the constitutionality of
zoning ordinances. Justice Sutherland rejected the argument that zoning
fails to promote any valid public purpose. He said that the city had the
power to prevent nuisances, and indicated that a nuisance was merely the
"right thing in the wrong place.' '21 He also held that zoning provides a
reasonable means to promote the orderly development of communities. 22
Justice Sutherland in Euclid did not reach the question whether a par-
ticular zoning ordinance, as applied, might fail the ends-means test. 23 He
Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594-95 (1962). For a modem use of this test by a state court,
see Potomac Sand & Gravel Co. v. Governor of Maryland, 226 Md. 358, 293 A.2d 241, 249 (1972).
17. The test as stated in Lawton emphasized two elements. Several commentators have since
separated out "undue oppression" as a distinct third element. D. GODSCHALK, D. BROWER, L.
McBENNar & B. VESTAL, supra note 3, at 46; Stoebuck, supra note 9, at 1081-82; Oakes, supra
note 4, at 592 n.46. Because the author believes that separating the "unduly oppressive" character of
the regulation from the means analysis makes an important difference in the interpretation of the
Lawton test, this Comment treats Lawton as creating a two-part test. See note 157 and accompanying
text infra.
18. 239 U.S. 394(1915).
19. Id. at 408-14.
20. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
21. Id. at388.
22. Id. at 395. Euclid was clearly a due process case. The Court focused on the ends-means test
and concluded that the regulation was reasonable. It did not discuss whether the regulation consti-
tuted a fifth amendment taking. This omission is more significant in light of the fact that the lower
court in Euclid relied on Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), to declare the regulation
a taking. Ambler Realty Co. v. Village of Euclid, 297 F. 307, 311-12 (N.D. Ohio 1924) rev'd, 272
U.S. 365 (1926). See generally THE TAKiNG IssuE, supra note 9, at 137-38.
23. 272U.S.at395.
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returned to this question in Nectow v. City of Cambridge,24 and wrote for
a unanimous Court that residential zoning of property in an industrial area
near railroad tracks was unreasonable because it did not bear a "substan-
tial relation to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare." 25
C. The Continued Relevance of Substantive Due Process to Land Use
Cases
The overthrow of Lochner v. New York 26 and its progeny 27 by the New
Deal Court28 convinced many that the substantive due process standard
had been consigned to the "dustbin of history." 29 Nevertheless, there are
several reasons to believe that a circumscribed substantive due process
doctrine still limits land use controls. First, the Supreme Court has twice
applied the substantive due process test in recent land use controversies.
For example, in Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead,30 the Court considered
a gravel pit owner's challenge to a regulation that prevented any contin-
ued mining. The Court applied the "still classic" Lawton v. Steele test 31
to the regulation, 32 and held that it was a reasonable use of the police
power. 33 A more recent example, though less directly on point, is the
Supreme Court's use of substantive due process in Moore v. City of East
Cleveland.34 This case involved a zoning ordinance limiting occupants of
a house to members of a nuclear family. The plurality opinion, written by
Justice Powell, invalidated the ordinance because it unreasonably in-
fringed on "family rights" substantively protected by the fourteenth
24. 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
25. Id. at 188. The decision in Nectow was reached on due process grounds. Although the Court
considered the fact that the plaintiff was seriously injured by the regulation, this was not determina-
tive. Instead, the Court found that the regulation failed the ends-means test because it had "'no foun-
dation in reason" and was "a mere arbitrary or irrational exercise of power." Id. at 187-88 (quoting
Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 260 Mass. 441, 157 N.E. 618, 620 (1928)). The Court therefore held
that the invasion of the plaintiff's rights lacked a "necessary basis" and invalidated the ordinance.
26. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
27. Cases generally linked with Lochner as exemplary of the era of economic due process in-
clude Allgeyer v. Louisiana. 165 U.S. 578 (1897), and Coppage v. Kansas. 236 U.S. I (1915). The
reader will note that the word "'progeny" is used loosely, as Allgeyer actually predates Lochner.
28. The cases generally taken to mark the end of the Lochner era are Nebbia v. New York, 291
U.S. 502 (1934), and West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). See generally Oakes.
supra note 2. at 592-93.
29. B. ACKERMAN, supra note 4, at 114. See also McCloskey, Economic Due Process and The
Supreme Court:An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 Sup. CT. REV. 34.
30. 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
31. See note 16 and accompanying text supra.
32. 369 U.S. at 594.
33. Id. at 596.
34. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
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amendment. 35 Mr. Justice Stevens, concurring in the judgment, based his
opinion on substantive due process protection of property ownership. 36
Both the plurality and concurring opinions in Moore cited Euclid and
Nectow as controlling precedents for land use cases. 37 Numerous other
recent Supreme Court decisions also demonstrate the continuing validity
of Euclid and Nectow as precedent. 38 Both of these cases were decided on
a substantive due process rationale. 39
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has strongly reaffirmed substantive
due process in many non-economic contexts.40 The Burger Court has
questioned the distinction between personal and economic rights. Speak-
ing for a unanimous Court in Lynch v. Household Finance Company,4
Justice Stewart stated, "the dichotomy between personal liberties and
property rights is a false one. . . . The right to enjoy property without
unlawful deprivation, no less than the right to speak or the right to travel,
is in truth a 'personal' right ... . "42 This sentiment is echoed in several
recent cases in which the Supreme Court used substantive standards to
measure the validity of state procedures for divesting persons of prop-
erty. 4 3
35. Id. at 502-06. The Court noted:
[s]ubstantive due process has at times been a treacherous field for this court. . . . As the history
of the Lochner era demonstrates, there is reason for concern lest the only limits to such judicial
intervention become the predilections of those who happen at the time to be Members of this
Court. That history counsels caution and restraint. But it does not counsel abandonment, nor
does it require what the city urges here: cutting off any protection of family rights at the first
convenient, if arbitrary boundary-the boundary of the nuclear family.
Id. at 502 (footnote omitted).
36. Id. at 514-15 (Stevens, J. concurring). Justice Stevens saw the "critical question presented
by this case" as "whether East Cleveland's housing ordinance is a permissible restriction on appel-
lant's right to use her own property as she sees fit." Id. at 513. He answered this question in the
negative. Id. at 520-21.
37. Id. at 498 n.6, 512-15.
38. See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260-61 (1980); Penn Central Transp.
Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 133 n.29 (1978); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropoli-
tan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 262 (1977). Arlington Heights emphasized the right of the
landowner "to be free from arbitrary or irrational zoning actions. See Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
. . .Nectow v. City of Cambridge ..... " Id.
39. See notes 22 & 25 and accompanying text supra.
40. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (protected family interests); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right of privacy); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
(same); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964) (right to travel). This reaffirmation of
substantive due process has received considerable critical support. See Perry, Substantive Due Pro-
cess Revisited: Reflections on (and Beyond) the Recent Cases, 71 Nw. U.L. REv. 417, 468-69
(1976); Tushnet, The Newer Property: Suggestions for a Revival of Substantive Due Process, 1975
Sup. Cr. REv. 261,279. See also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 564 (1978).
41. 405 U.S. 538 (1972).
42. Id. at 552. See generally Oakes, supra note 4, at 594-95.
43. North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Fuentes v. Shevin,
407 U.S. 593 (1972). See Oakes, supra note 4, at 597-98; Tushnet, supra note 40, at 273-77.
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Finally, state courts often examine legislation affecting property rights
more closely than does the Supreme Court. 44 The state courts base their
review on due process or "law of the land" clauses in state constitutions,
or simply on notions of natural law. 45 Thus, even if the Supreme Court
were to hold that the federal constitution has no application to local land
use regulations, substantive due process would continue to define the
range of permissible regulations in many state courts.
D. The Test for Substantive Due Process in Modern Land Use Cases
To summarize, the substantive due process test used in the cases above
can be divided into four basic elements. First, the regulation must serve
some public end. Second, the means employed by the regulation must
bear a reasonable relation to the purpose that the regulation seeks to
achieve. Third, the means employed must not unduly injure the individu-
als affected by the regulation. Finally, the court applying the due process
test must balance the public interest in the regulation against the harm to
the individual. The test essentially provides some structure for an ad hoc
determination of the regulation's overall reasonableness. Ordinarily, a
court will not invalidate a regulation unless it decides that it has "no
foundation in reason and is a mere arbitrary or irrational exercise of [the
police] power.' '46
II. "REGULATORY TAKINGS"
A. The Origins of the Concept ofRegulatory Takings
The second important limit on the power of government to regulate
land uses stems from the just compensation clause of the fifth amend-
ment. The idea that a police power regulation could constitute a fifth
amendment "taking" of property sprang virtually ex nihilo from the pen
of Justice Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal Company v. Mahon.47 Pennsyl-
vania Coal involved a Pennsylvania law prohibiting all mining that en-
dangered the surface support of dwellings. 48 Mahon, a homeowner, sued
44. Comment, State Economic Substantive Due Process: A Proposed Approach, 88 YALE L.J.
1487, 1487-88 & n.5 (1979).
45. Id.
46. Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 187 (1928) (quoting Village of Euclid v. Am-
bler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 366, 395 (1926)).
47. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). Justice Holmes experimented with this theory in a number of earlier
cases, but his statements were limited to dicta. See Block v. Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135, 156 (1921);
Rideout v. Knox, 148 Mass. 368, 374, 19 N.E. 390, 392-93 (1890). See generally THE TAKING
ISSUE, supra note 9, at 124-26.
48. 260 U.S. 393,412-13 (1922).
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under the law to enjoin Pennsylvania Coal Company from mining under
his property, despite a clause in his deed that specifically deprived him of
the right to sue for any loss of surface support. 49 The Court held that the
Pennsylvania statute was invalid, and said "that while property may be
regulated to a certain extent, if the regulation goes too far it will be recog-
nized as a taking. "50 Justice Holmes held that because the law deprived
Pennsylvania Coal of the only profitable use of its property it constituted a
taking.51
Pennsylvania Coal was the first decision to contradict the statement in
Mugler v. Kansas52 that a police power regulation could only be chal-
lenged for lack of due process, and never as a taking. 53 Justice Holmes
apparently recognized the conflict between these cases, 54 but did not ex-
plicitly overrule or even cite Mugler. The modem Court continues to rely
on both cases and the conflict has never been resolved. 55
49. Id. at412.
50. Id. at 415.
51. Id. at 416. In one revealing passage, Justice Holmes acknowledged that government may
permissibly reduce the value of private property "to some extent." He continued:
As long recognized some values are enjoyed under an implied limitation, and must yield to the
police power. But obviously the implied limitation must have its limits or the contract and due
process clauses are gone. One fact for consideration in determining such limits is the extent of
the diminution. When it reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must be an
exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act.
Id. at 413.
52. 123 U.S. 623 (1887). See text accompanying notes 13-15 supra.
53. 123 U.S. at 668. The Mugler Court stated:
[t]he power which the States have of prohibiting such use by individuals of their property as will
be prejudicial to the health, the morals, or the safety of the public, is not-and, consistently
with the existence and safety of organized society, cannot be-burdened with the condition that
the State must compensate such individual owners for pecuniary losses they may sustain ...
Id. at669.
For cases that follow the Mugler analysis, see, e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394
(1915); Consolidated Rock Prod. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 515, 370 P.2d 342, 20 Cal.
Rptr. 638, appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 36 (1962). Additional cases are cited in Stoebuck, supra note
9, at 1060 nn.19-20.
Professor Cunningham states that, "[p]rior to [Mahon], the Court seemingly would not invalidate
a land use regulation as a taking, no matter how much financial loss it caused the landowner, pro-
vided that the regulation had a proper purpose and employed means that were rationally related to the
achievement of that purpose." Cunningham, Inverse Condemnation as a Remedy for "Regulatory
Takings," 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 517,519 (1981).
54. Holmes did not cite Mugler in Pennsylvania Coal, seemingly unaware that there was any
conflict between the cases. Contemporaneous letters, however, show that this ignorance was more
feigned than real. Holmes wrote Laski in 1922 that he had "always thought old Harlan's decision in
Mugler v. Kansas was pretty fishy." 1 HOLMES-LASKY LETERS 473 (M. Howe ed. 1953).
55. Oakes, supra note 4, at 607. Judge Oakes states that "[tihe law of takings, at least as ex-
pressed by the Supreme Court, has essentially been without doctrinal advance for fifty years, and...
two opposing and inconsistent lines of authority have not been explained or resolved; they are simply
there." Id. See also Stoebuck, supra note 9, at 1069.
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B. The Doctrine of Regulatory Takings in Modern Land Use Cases
The Supreme Court has not found any land use regulation to be a taking
since Pennsylvania Coal.56 Nevertheless, the case is repeatedly cited by
the Supreme Court57 and many state courts have relied on it to hold that
particular regulations work takings. 58 These cases, however, also show
that Justice Holmes' simple but enigmatic "too far" test has been greatly
altered and elaborated over the years. The original focus on the depriva-
tion to the landowner has given way, in most cases, to a more complex
analysis. Three modem Supreme Court cases, all rejecting taking chal-
lenges to land use regulations, illustrate the additions that courts have
made to Holmes' "too far" test.
In the first of these cases, Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead,59 the Court
rejected a taking challenge brought by a gravel pit owner to an ordinance
forbidding any mining below the water table. The Court held that the lan-
downer's diminution in value, standing by itself, did not constitute a tak-
ing. The Court did not identify the additional factors that bear on this
determination, however, and concluded that there was "no set formula"
to identify when a regulation crossed the line to become a fifth amend-
ment taking. 60
In Penn Central Transportation Company v. New York City,6 1 the
Court considered the validity of historic preservation zoning. It held that
no taking occurred when the owner of Grand Central Station was denied
permission to construct an office building over the historic structure. In a
lengthy discussion of the test for takings, the Court again denied that any
single formula exists, and stated that the question involves "essentially
ad hoc, factual inquiries." 62 The facts that the court considered important
included the public purpose asserted for the regulation, 63 the extent of the
56. Only four cases involving land use regulations that present the taking question have reached
the Supreme Court since Pennsvlania Coal. The Court has upheld each of these regulations. San
Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981) (open space zoning): Agins v.
City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (large lot residential zoning): Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City
of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (historic preservation zoning): Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead.
369 U.S. 590 (1962) (prohibition of gravel mining).
57. See, e.g.. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980): Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S.
51. 66 (1980): Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York. 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978).
58. See, e.g., Burrows v. City of Keene, 121 N.H. 590, 432 A.2d 15 (1981): Arverne Bay
Constr. Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 231. 15 N.E.2d 587. 591 (1938) See generally THE TAKING
IssuE, supra note 9.
59. 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
60. Id. at 594.
61. 438 U.S. 104(1978).
62. ld. at 124.
63. Id. at 125, 129
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burden on the landowner, 64 the treatment of similar parcels, 65 and
whether the regulation deprived the owner of a well-defined property in-
terest. 66 The Court's analysis implicitly endorsed a balancing of all these
factors to determine the constitutionality of the regulation.
The most recent Supreme Court formulation of the test for land use
takings occurred in Agins v. City of Tiburon.67 This case involved a chal-
lenge to open space zoning in a wealthy suburb of San Francisco. Justice
Powell, speaking for a unanimous Court, formulated a three part test for
regulatory takings. He stated:
The application of a general zoning law to particular property effects a tak-
ing [1] if the ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state inter-
ests . . . [2] or denies an owner economically valuable use of his land....
[3] [T]he question necessarily requires a weighing of private and public in-
terests. 68
The Court held that the challenged zoning passed all three elements of the
test, and rejected the takings claim.
The three-part test formulated by Justice Powell in Agins typifies the
modem test for regulatory takings. Many courts state that a regulation
becomes a compensable taking if it does not advance a valid public pur-
pose.69 Justice Powell's second element, that a regulation is a taking if it
"denies the owner economically valuable use of his land," essentially
restates the central theme of Holmes' "too far" test. This element re-
mains the most important element in the regulatory takings test used in
most courts. 70 Finally, most courts balance the public gain from the regu-
lation with the private loss to determine whether it amounts to a taking. 71
64. Id. at 124.
65. Id. at 133 n.29.
66. Id. at 124-25.
67. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
68. Id. at 260.
69. E.g., id.; see National Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597, 608 (1965).
See generally Stoebuck, supra note 9, at 1066 n.47.
70. E.g., Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980); Steel Hill Dev., Inc. v. Sanbomton, 469
F.2d 956, 963 (1st Cir. 1972); Arveme Bay Constr. Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E.2d 587
(1938). In Arverne Bay the court said:
[a]n ordinance which permanently so restricts the use of property that it cannot be used for any
reasonable purpose goes, it is plain, beyond regulation, and must be recognized as a taking of
the property. The only substantial difference, in such case, between restriction and actual taking
is that the restriction leaves the owner subject to the burden of payments of taxation, while
outright confiscation would relieve him of that burden.
id. at 232.
71. E.g., Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980); Maple Leaf Investors, Inc. v. Dept. of
Ecology, 88 Wn. 2d 726, 565 P.2d 1162 (1977) (court used balancing test to uphold floodplain
zoning). See generally THE TAKING IssuE, supra note 9, at 139; Comment, supra note 12, at 327 n.54
and cases cited therein.
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11. ANALYSIS
A. Courts Have Blended and Confused the Tests for Substantive Due
Process and Takings
The theories of substantive due process and eminent domain developed
separately from distinct constitutional provisions. Substantive due pro-
cess requires that governments enact regulations that are reasonable. 72
Eminent domain, on the other hand, prohibits government from acquiring
private property without payment. 73
Nevertheless, the tests that modem courts use to determine whether a
land use regulation is a violation of substantive due process or a taking
have become so intertwined that it is difficult to distinguish between
them. Essentially the same elements are considered using each of the
tests. For example, the first and second elements of the due process test,
namely that the regulation has a public purpose and uses means reason-
ably necessary to accomplish the purpose, 74 are integrated into the first
element of the modem taking test: that the regulation "substantially ad-
vance" a valid public purpose. 75 In addition, both tests include a balanc-
ing element. 76 And, although there is a theoretical distinction between
Pennsylvania Coal's "too far" language and Lawton's "unduly oppres-
sive" formulation, the difference is not one that could easily be applied
72. Lack of substantive due process is often equated with the regulation's -unreasonableness."
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926) (zoning regulation not "unreason-
able"); Richardson v. Beattie, 98 N.H. 71, 95 A.2d 122, 126 (1953) (regulation "unreasonable"
and therefore violative of due process). See D. GODSCHALK, D. BROWER, L. McBENNEr & B. VES-
TAL. supra note 3, at 43:
Substantive due process is concerned with the rights and duties of people and governments in
their ordinary relations with each other. It includes a concern for what the government can do,
the limits of its regulatory powers, and the essential fairness of governmental actions. A law
may violate the substantive due process guarantee if it seeks to control something that is beyond
its power to control, or controls it in a way that is unfair.
73. The emphasis in eminent domain is on fairness to the affected individual, not on the overall
reasonableness of the regulation. These concerns overlap, certainly, yet they remain distinct in focus.
See Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just
Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165 (1967). Professor Michelman equates the determina-
tion of a regulation's reasonableness with the use of a balancing test. He then shows that this test is
inapplicable to the issue of compensation for takings.
[J]udgements about efficiency exhaust the significance of any comparison of gains flowing from
a measure with the losses occasioned by it. In particular, although a weighing of A's losses
against the gains of B. C, and D may tell us whether a measure is efficient, that weighing cannot
tell us whether the measure may be justly enforced against A without compensating him.
Id. at 1196.
74. See part ID supra.
75. See notes 82-84 and accompanying text supra.
76. See parts ID & IB supra.
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by the courts. 77 Both tests, as they are applied today, converge on a single
requirement of reasonableness.
This blending of substantive due process and takings into a single limi-
tation on land use regulations might appear unimportant, but there is an
important reason to resist this development. The characterization of the
test can affect the remedy applied. Ordinarily, courts remedy due process
violations by invalidating the ordinance. 78 Takings, on the other hand,
are almost invariably remedied by the payment of monetary damages. 79
But land use takings are one area where this distinction has broken down.
Courts have traditionally invalidated land use regulations that they de-
clare are takings. 80 Recently, however, some courts have indicated that
regulatory takings also trigger payment of compensation for the value lost
by the landowner. 81 This trend is highlighted by Justice Brennan's dis-
senting opinion in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego,82
a case involving open space zoning. The majority did not reach the mer-
its,83 but Justice Brennan, speaking for three other justices and with the
apparent support of a fourth, 84 stated that the zoning constituted a taking
77. See Stoebuck, supra note 9, at 1082.
78. See note 10 and accompanying text supra. There has been some recent interest in the possi-
bility of a damage remedy for due process violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See generally Man-
delker, supra note 10, at 506-512; Bosselman & Bonder, Potential Immunity of Land Use Control
Systems from CivilRights andAntitrust Liability, 8 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 453,456-59 (1981). This
remedy remains highly speculative and appears to have little applicability to typical land use situa-
tions. Mandelker, supra note 10, at 507-512.
79. See note 78 supra.
80. See note 10 and accompanying text supra. See generally Cunningham, supra note 8, at 517;
Wright, Exclusionary Land Use Controls and the Taking Issue, 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 545, 578
(1981).
81. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 658-59 (1981) (Brennan,
J., dissenting); Burrows v. City of Keene, 121 N.H. 581, 432 A.2d 15 (1981) (relying on Brennan's
dissent in San Diego Gas to require compensation for land use taking); Eldridge v. City of Palo Alto,
51 Cal. App. 3d 726, 124 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1975), vacated on rehearing, 57 Cal. App. 3d 613, 129
Cal. Rptr. 575 (1976); Beyer v. City of Palo Alto, 57 Cal. App. 3d 613, 129 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1976)
(decided with Eldridge on remand). The Eldridge decision, which endorsed a damage remedy for
regulatory takings, was overruled by the California Supreme Court in Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24
Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979), affdon other grounds, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
This damage remedy is often referred to as the "inverse condemnation" remedy, invoking the anal-
ogy to those eminent domain cases where the landowner sues the government for compensation for a
taking instead of the more normal pattern in eminent domain where the government initiates the
proceeding to condemn the land.
82. 450U.S. 621 (1981).
83. The majority did not reach the takings issue because of the absence of a final judgment. Id. at
633.
84. Justice Rehnquist, concurring in the dismissal for lack of a final judgment, stated that, on the
merits, he "would have little difficulty in agreeing with much of what is said in the dissenting opinion
of Justice Brennan." Id. at 633-34. (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
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and that the fifth amendment required the city to correct it by paying dam-
ages. 85
The argument for monetary damages for land use takings rests primar-
ily on a simple syllogism: (1) excessively restrictive land use regulations
are fifth amendment takings; (2) takings are remedied by the payment of
just compensation; (3) therefore, excessively restrictive land use regula-
tions are remedied by the payment of just compensation. 86 This syllogism
has logical force only if its major premise is correct. 87 One must ask
whether the modem "regulatory takings" test actually identifies fifth
amendment takings, or whether it is a mislabeled test for substantive due
process. 88
85. Id. at 658-59, 661. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan stated:
[iln my view, once a court establishes that there was a regulatory 'taking," the Constitution
demands that the government entity pay just compensation for the period commencing on the
date the regulation first effected the "taking," and ending on the date the government entity
chooses to rescind or otherwise amend the regulation.
Id. at 653. Justice Brennan bases this conclusion on the notion of fairness to the individual land-
owner.
If the regulation denies the private property owner the use and enjoyment of his land and is
found to effect a "taking," it is only fair that the public bear the cost of benefits received during
the interim period between application of the regulation and the government entity's recission of
it.
Id. at 656-57.
86. See Mandelker, supra note 10, at 498.
87. The force of this syllogism can be questioned even if all its terms are granted. Professor
Mandelker argues that the normal remedial hierarchy for private law suits is responsive to policy
considerations, and that these considerations require a court to reject the "inverse condemnation"
remedy for regulatory takings. Id. at 495-99. Most writers agree that the "inverse condemnation"
remedy would have unfortunate consequences on the ability of government to plan land uses because
of the fear of crushing liability and the uncertainty of the taking standards. Hall, Eldridge v. City of
Palo Alto: Aberration or New Direction in Land Use Law?, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1569. 1597 (1977) (a
monetary inverse condemnation remedy "will intimidate legislative bodies and will discourage the
implementation of strict or innovative planning measures in favor of measures which are less strin-
gent, more traditional, and fiscally safe."); Wright, supra note 80, at 583-84: Note, Takings Law-
Is Inverse Condemnation an Appropriate Remedy for Due Process Violations?. 57 WASH. L. REV.
551. 566-67 (1982). Justice Brennan, however, claimed to be totally unmoved by these policy argu-
ments. stating: "the applicability of express constitutional guarantees is not a matter to be determined
on the basis of policy judgments made by the legislative, executive or judicial branches. " San Diego
Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego. 450 U.S. 621, 661 (198 1) (Brennan, J.. dissenting).
88. See Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York. 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d 381.
385 N.Y.S.2d5 (1976). The Fred F. French court argued persuasively that many courts that have
used takings language have used it as a "metaphor" for lack of substantive due process. 350 N.E.2d
at 385. The court said:
[tihe metaphor should not be confused with the reality. Close examination of the [regulatory
takings] cases reveals that in none of them, anymore than in the Pennsyvlvania Coal
case . . . was there an actual "taking" under the eminent domain power, despite the use of
the terms "taking" or "confiscatory." Instead in each, the gravamen of the constitutional chal-
lenge was that it was an invalid exercise of the police power under the due process clause, and
the cases were decided under that rubric.
Id. (citations omitted). Despite the Fred F. French court's clear repudiation of the takings analysis. at
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1. Substantive Due Process Concepts Have Entered Eminent Domain
In land use cases, the due process and takings limitations have been
confused and blended to the point that it is difficult to identify the reason-
ing used in many decisions. The intertwining of due process and eminent
domain has resulted, in part, from confusion of precedents. Although the
two clauses have spawned two lines of precedent that relate to the consti-
tutionality of land use regulations, courts tend to use due process and tak-
ings precedents interchangeably, without clearly recognizing the doctri-
nal differences between the concepts.
An early example of this blending is Goldblatt v. Town of Hemp-
stead.89 The Goldblatt court cited both Pennsylvania Coal and Lawton as
controlling precedents. 90 Justice Clark, in Goldblatt, recognized the dif-
ference between the tests espoused in these cases but the juxtaposition
initiated further doctrinal confusion. This intertwining was exacerbated in
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York. 91 Justice Brennan,
speaking for the majority, cited Euclid, Nectow, Mugler, and other due
process cases alongside Pennsylvania Coal and other cases explicitly re-
lying on a takings analysis. 92 To make matters worse, he presented the
Mugler approach and the Pennsylvania Coal approach as alternative ways
to approach the takings problem, despite the irreconcilability of these
cases. 93 Finally, in Agins v. City of Tiburon,94 the Court developed its
three-part test for regulatory takings, while relying indiscriminately on
cases from each line of precedent. Specifically, the Court cited Nectow to
support the proposition that a regulation becomes a taking if it does not
least one commentator has asserted that it held the challenged regulation "to be a taking." Wright,
supra note 80, at 577 n. 138 (1981). This exemplifies the common tendency to confuse the due pro-
cess and takings issues.
Professor Stoebuck has identified three major problems that have hindered clear analysis in this
area: (I) failure to work within the constitutional language and history of the takings clause; (2)
failure to make the theory of regulatory takings consistent with the theory developed for other "non-
trespassory takings"; and, (3) failure to recognize the proper place of substantive due process. Stoe-
buck, supra note 9, at 1080-82. This Comment uses a similar analysis to distinguish between the
valid and the invalid in this confusing area of law.
89. 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
90. Id. at 594-95.
91. 438 U.S. 104(1978).
92. Id. at 124-25, 127.
93. Id. at 124-27. The Mugler and Pennsylvania Coal cases are irreconcilable because the first
stated that a Valid police power regulation could never be a taking, while the second held that the
difference was merely a matter of degree. See Stoebuck, supra note 9, at 1068. Professor Stoebuck
claims that "[t]he Supreme Court's lengthy majority and dissenting opionions in Penn Central com-
pound rather than disentangle the doctrinal imbroglio over when a taking occurs. To say, as the
majority appears to, that a number of alternative theories exist is, if taken on its face, to create situa-
tions of near anarchy." Id. at 1069.
94. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
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"substantially advance legitimate state interests." 95 Pennsylvania Coal
was cited to support the second element: that a regulation becomes a tak-
ing if it "denies an owner economically viable use of his land." 96 And
for the third element, the need to balance public benefit against private
loss, the Court cited Euclid as the "seminal decision.' 97 Euclid and Nec-
tow, of course, were decided on a substantive due process rationale and
did not explore the possibility that the challenged regulation was a tak-
ing.98
In addition to this confusion of precedent, there are doctrinal reasons to
reject the public purpose and balancing elements as part of the test for
fifth amendment takings. Analysis shows that the second element of the
Agins test, the extent that the regulation burdens the landowner, is the
only doctrinally sound element in a test for regulatory takings.
a. Public Purpose Requirement
The modem test for regulatory takings states that a regulation is a tak-
ing if it is not substantially related to a valid public purpose. This require-
ment, however, is not grounded in eminent domain.
It is a basic tenet of eminent domain doctrine that any exercise of that
power must further some public purpose. 99 This rule is designed, in part,
to prevent governments from spending public funds for private purposes
or in ways that clearly provide no benefit to the public. For this reason, an
attempted exercise of the power of eminent domain will be invalid if it
serves no public purpose.
This reasoning is inverted when courts hold that a regulation is a taking
because it serves no public purpose. 00 This necessarily means that there
has been an exercise of eminent domain that does not further any public
purpose. It follows that the public must pay for a regulation if it provides
them with no real benefit. This contradicts the rationale behind the public
use doctrine in eminent domain: that public funds be expended only to
further public interests. 101
95. Id.at 260.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 261.
98. See notes 22 & 25 and accompanying text supra.
99. E.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
100. E.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255,260 (1980).
101. Justice Brennan recognized this inconsistency in his San Diego Gas dissent. He stated that
the taking question arises only when an otherwise valid use of the police power is too restrictive on
the landowner;
A different case may arise where a police power regulation is not enacted in furtherance of the
public health, safety, morals, or general welfare so that there may be no "public use." Although
the government entity may not be forced to pay just compensation under the Fifth Amendment.
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The public purpose requirement is the first part of the substantive due
process test. 102 It is logical to hold a regulation unreasonable and void if it
does not advance any public interest. But this requirement bears little re-
lationship to eminent domain, and provides no reason to require a govern-
ment to compensate the landowner.
b. Balancing Public Need Against Private Loss
A balancing test is also an element of both the modern test for regula-
tory takings and the substantive due process test. Balancing is clearly ap-
propriate under the substantive due process test for the reasonableness of
a regulation. 103 It is, however, an inappropriate addition to the Pennsyl-
vania Coal test for regulatory takings.
Several writers have tried to find support for a balancing test in Penn-
sylvania Coal. 104 However, the thrust of Justice Holmes' opinion opposes
the utilitarian calculus implicit in this test. 105 He emphasized that exces-
sive diminutions of private property rights are absolutely prohibited, no
matter how great the public need. "We are in danger of forgetting," Jus-
tice Holmes wrote, "that a strong public desire to improve the public
condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut
than the constitutional way of paying for the change." 1 06
Further, balancing is abhorrent to the theory of eminent domain. A
strong public need for acquiring a small piece of property is never bal-
anced against the possibility that the cost to the owner will be slight. 107
Whether private property has been taken for public use is determined
without reference to the strength of the public need or the value of the
the landowner may nevertheless have a damages cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983... for
a Fourteenth Amendment due process violation.
San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621,656 n.23 (1981).
102. See notes 16-17 and accompanying text supra.
103. See Stoebuck, supra note 9, at 1065; Comment, supra note 12, at 331-33.
104. THE TAKING ISSUE, supra note 9, at 139, 207, 238, 256; Comment, supra note 12, at
327-28.
105. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,414-16 (1922); See Comment, supra note
12, at 328-30.
106. 260U.S. at416.
107. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 102 S.Ct. 3164 (1982). Loretto af-
firmed the "traditional rule" that a permanent physical occupation of property is a taking per se, and
held that courts may not balance public against private interests in making this judgment. Id. at 3174,
3179. See also Stoebuck, supra note 9, at 1065-66. Professor Stoebuck urges that "[i]t is contrary to
our entire concept of eminent domain to say that urgent necessity will justify an uncompensated
taking when a less pressing public purpose will not.... Physical appropriation without compensation
would result whenever an imperative public need exists." Id.
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property taken. 1 08 Once a taking is identified, the only remaining question
concerns the amount of compensation.
Balancing deprives the Pennsylvania Coal "too far" test of any inde-
pendent force and effect. It turns a prohibition couched in absolute terms
into a relative and conditional impediment. In other words, the balancing
test protects private property only when the court finds that the regulation
is unreasonable. Emphasis on the reasonableness of the regulation is con-
sistent with due process, but antithetical to eminent domain. 109
c. A "True" Test for Regulatory Takings
Because most elements used by courts to identify regulatory takings
derive from substantive due process, the question arises: What is left of
the test for regulatory takings? This question requires a return to the roots
of the doctrine in Pennsylvania Coal Company v. Mahon. 110 The "too
far" test does provide an independent test for regulatory takings that is
related to eminent domain.
The "too far" test arose from Holmes' fascination with the concept of
property as a bundle of rights. "'1 He saw that the right to use property is
an important right of ownership, or, more correctly, the result of having
other rights. 1 2 The owner claiming that the regulation has gone "too
far" is alleging that the public has taken one of the most valuable sticks in
his bundle, the right of profitable use. The Supreme Court has long recog-
nized that the property protected by the fifth amendment is not limited to
the layman's conception of "property" as a physical "thing." " 3
108. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 102 S.Ct. 3164, 3171 (1982). Loretto
distinguishes permanent physical occupations of property, which it subjects to the per se rule, from
temporary invasions and regulations that only limit the owner's use of the property. Temporary inva-
sions and regulatory burdens, according to Loretto, remain subject to a balancing test.
Loretto represents a positive step in Supreme Court takings jurisprudence. By definitively remov-
ing permanent physical occupations of property from the balancing process, it obviates the fear that
balancing will spread from the regulatory context to other areas of eminent domain. Nevertheless.
Loretto fails to show persuasively why balancing should be retained even for regulations and tempo-
rary physical invasions. It decided only that balancing was not appropriate in the context of perma-
nent physical occupations. Therefore, its statements about the continued validity of balancing in other
contexts is dicta.
109. See id. See also Stoebuck, supra note 9, at 1065. Professor Stoebuck states: "Balancing is
also too 'dangerous' to function as a test for a police power taking. Balancing allows the government
to destroy real property rights completely, even to appropriate land physically, provided the public
necessity is urgent enough." Id.
110. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
Ill. See THE TAKING ISSUE, supra note 9, at 240-46.
112. Id.
113. See, e.g., United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373. 378-79 (1944). The
Court stated that "property" is not construed in the "vulgar and untechnical sense of the physical
thing with respect to which the citizen exercises rights recognized by the law. . . . [Instead it]
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Holmes' opinion left unanswered at least one crucial question: What
quantum of deprivation will trigger a taking claim? This point cannot
readily be identified from Pennsylvania Coal,114 subsequent cases, 115 or
from the commentators, 116 and is beyond the scope of this Comment.
Courts generally have refused to limit their scrutiny to the one factor
singled out by Holmes' "too far" test. Instead, courts apply a more flexi-
ble test. But this flexibility can only be accomplished under the takings
rubric through considerable manipulation of the legal test involved. These
courts have ignored the fact that the substantive due process test provides
the flexibility necessary to analyze land use regulations. It has the added
advantage of avoiding the doctrinal inconsistencies that have plagued at-
tempts to enlarge the takings test beyond its original contours.
IV. THE NEED FOR A FLEXIBLE TEST
Land use regulations in this country are characterized by their diver-
sity. Every level of government, from the smallest village to the national
legislature, has imposed some form of land use control. The problems
these controls address range from parochial concerns of suburban com-
munities to economic and environmental issues of national significance.
Governments use a variety of methods to regulate lands. Even within the
denote[s] the group of rights inhering in the citizen's relation to the physical thing, as the right to
possess, use and dispose of it." Id. at 377-78.
114. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). Justice Holmes' statements on this point are equivocal. He stated that
"the question depends upon the particular facts." Id. at 413. Holmes also warned that "this is a
question of degree-and therefore cannot be disposed of by general propositions. But we regard this
as going beyond any of the cases decided by this Court." Id. at 416. As a whole, Holmes' opinion is
remarkably devoid of guidelines for future courts seeking to determine the degree of diminution that
would trigger a taking.
115. E.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962) ("no set formula to
determine where regulation ends and taking begins"); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979) (the
question "calls as much for the exercise of judgment as for the application of logic"). Analysis of
"regulatory takings" cases in state courts reveals no pattern regarding the amount of diminution in
the owner's value that will result in a taking. Compare, e.g., National Land & Investment Co. v.
Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597, 608 (1965) (regulation ruled taking when it diminished land value
from $260,000 to $175,000) with Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d
515, 370 P.2d 342, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638 (not a taking although property rendered valueless), appeal
dismissed, 371 U.S. 36 (1962). Compare Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis.2d 7, 201 N.W.2d
761,771 (1972) (wetland regulation does not go "too far" when it merely prohibits owner from
making uses of the land that are impossible in its natural state) with State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711,
716 (Me. 1970) (wetland regulation which prohibited owner from filling land ruled taking because it
left landowner with no valuable use).
116. See, e.g., Wright, supra note 80: "Legal scholars still are in search of rules or a formula
which will lend precision to a process which is doomed to imprecision by the state of the law." Id.
Attempts to find the precise point at which the diminution in value becomes a taking have all ended in
failure. See THE TAKNG Issut, supra note 9, at 208-211; Stoebuck, supra note 9, at 1064.
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confines of traditional "euclidean" zoning,"17 the regulations vary
greatly as to the intensity of the use permitted and the size of the area
zoned for each use. Recently developed regulatory techniques make this
diversity even more apparent. The advent of timed growth controls, 118
planned unit zones, 119 transferrable development rights, 120 and other new
techniques make sweeping generalizations about the legal implications of
land use controls ever more difficult to sustain.
A logical byproduct of this diversity is the need for flexibility in any
test for the constitutionality of land use regulations. Many factors influ-
ence the reasonableness of land use regulations. A judgment that a regula-
tion is or is not constitutional requires a court to make an essentially polit-
ical choice. This choice is aided by a test that allows the court to consider
all the factors that are relevant to the regulation in its social context. It is
hindered by a test requiring a mechanical judgment based on considera-
tion of only one factor.
The cases support this need for a flexible test. Courts employing both
the substantive due process and the takings tests have done so in ways that
allow them maximum latitude. The substantive due process test requires
that a court consider and balance a large number of factors. Although the
takings test began with a single inquiry, courts have expanded it to the
point where it replicates the elements of the substantive due process test.
Justice Brennan's endorsement of "ad hoc, factual inquiries" in Penn
117. "Euclidean zoning" is a planning technique that divides the community into areas defined
by the zoning authority, each subject to different use restrictions. The technique was first approved in
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 366 (1926). It takes its name from that case and
from the geometric rigidity that often characterizes the technique.
118. See notes 158-71 and accompanying text infra.
119. Planned unit development (P.U.D.) concepts have been introduced to counteract the ri-
gidity of Euclidean zoning. As defined in one case:
P.U.D.is the antithesis of the exclusive districting principle which is the mainstay of "'Eucli-
dean" zoning. The latter approach divided a community into districts, and explicitly mandated
segregated uses. P.U.D., on the other hand, is an instrument of land use control which augments
and supplements existing master plans and zoning ordinances, and permits a mixture of land
uses on the same tract .... It also enables municipalities to negotiate with developers concern-
ing proposed uses . . . which may be contrary to existing ordinances if the planned project is
determined to be in the public and individual homeowner's interest. It also recognizes the impor-
tance of encouraging and making it financially worthwhile for developers and investors to under-
take P.U.D. projects by permitting a more intensified utilization of vacant land ....
Rudderow v. Township Comm. of Mount Laurel, 121 N.J. Super. 409, 297 A.2d 583. 585 (1972).
quoted in I A. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF PLANNING AND ZONING 1- 16 (4th ed. 1975).
120. Transferrable development rights are a technique to provide partial compensation for zoning
by allowing the restricted owner to sell rights to others to allow them to develop their property more
intensely than would otherwise be permitted. See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438
U.S. 104 (1978); Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d 381.
385 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1976).
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Central12' and Justice Powell's three-part test in Agins122 are examples of
"takings" tests that contain all the breadth and flexibility of substantive
due process. As discussed above, however, the balancing and public pur-
pose elements are incompatible with the theory and purpose of the fifth
amendment's just compensation clause. 123 Nevertheless, that most courts
include these elements shows an understandable judicial reluctance to ap-
ply the Pennsylvania Coal test in a rigid, mechanical fashion.
A. An Example of the Need for Flexibility: Zoning for Minimum Lot
Sizes
Zoning for minimum lot sizes illustrates the need for a flexible consti-
tutional test. Although lot size restrictions are among the most simple and
traditional of planning tools, they have been the subject of frequent litiga-
tion. 124 Lot size restrictions are enacted for many reasons, from protec-
tion of critical environmental areas to economic exclusion. 125 The burden
that the zoning places on the landowner tends to increase with the size of
the lot required, subject to facts intrinsic to the zoned property.126 All
things being equal, the landowner's loss of use and enjoyment is greater
when a lot is zoned for a forty acre minimum lot than when it is zoned for
a one acre minimum lot. The proportional nature of this impact, and the
frequency with which these controls are challenged in court, make them
an ideal laboratory in which to examine the factors that courts use to de-
cide land use cases.
Under one rubric or another, courts have essentially employed a bal-
ancing test to determine the constitutionality of minimum lot size regula-
tions. 127 Courts generally balance the public's need for the regulation
against the harm to the owner. The public's need is itself separable into a
number of different elements. Courts have looked at the size and sophisti-
cation of the government entity, the amount and quality of the planning
121. Penn Central Transp.Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
122. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260-61 (1980).
123. See notes 99-109 and accompanying text supra.
124. See, e.g., Wright, supra note 80, at 551-53 and cases cited therein.
125. Compare, e.g., Wilson v. County of McHenry, 92 11. App.3d 997,416 N.E.2d 426 (1981)
(160-acre agricultural zoning to preserve prime farm land), with Southern Burlington County
NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (court found that large lot resi-
dential zoning was enacted for purpose of excluding low income groups and racial minorities from
community), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
126. See THE TAKING IssuE, supra note 9, at 205-07; Wright, supra note 80, at 571-75.
127. See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260-61 (1980) (one- to five-acre mini-
mum upheld under takings analysis); Steel Hill Dev. Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956 (5th
Cir. 1972) (six-acre minimum upheld under due process analysis); Duggan v. County of Cook, 60
Ill.2d 107, 324 N.E.2d 406, (1975) (20,000 square foot minimum invalidated under due process
analysis). See also Wright, supra note 80, at 551 nn.31-32 and cases cited therein.
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preceding the enactment, and the urgency of the problem addressed, as
measures of the public's need for the regulation.
1. The Public's Need
a. The Source of the Regulation
The size and sophistication of the regulating body is an important fac-
tor that courts look to in determining the reasonableness of a minimum lot
size regulation. 12 8 For two reasons, courts do not, and should not, afford
the same presumption of validity to land use decisions of local govern-
ments that they do to those of larger units.
First, many local government decisions reflect a purely parochial out-
look. 129 A minimum lot size regulation that is perfectly rational for a
suburban town might have harmful affects on the metropolitan area as a
whole. For example, a suburban community may attempt to avoid low
income housing or new development by zoning all or most of the commu-
nity for large residential lot sizes. The effect of this regulation would be
to divert growth to nearby communities and to decrease the opportunites
for low cost housing in the area.1 30 Courts often give less deference to
local governmental regulations that disregard these state or regional con-
cerns.1 31 This consideration is especially important when the local gov-
128. Few cases state baldly that local governmental restrictions are subject to stricter scrutiny.
But see note 131 infra and cases cited therein. Traditionally courts have purported to apply the same
presumption of validity to regulations from local governments that they apply to acts of Congress or
of state legislatures. Wright, supra note 80, at 568. Professor Wright adds, however, that "no one
involved in this field can believe very seriously that courts do this in fact, and there is considerable
doubt that they should." Id. See also THE TAKING ISSUE. supra note 9, at 229: "Traditionally. local
land use regulations have not been treated by the courts with the same deference shown by the courts
to state regulations. Although the courts have established a 'presumption of validity' for local regula-
tions, in many states the presumption is easily rebutted." Id.
129. See generally Kolis, Citadels of Privilege: Exclusionarn Land Use Regulations and the Pre-
sumption of Constitutional Validity, 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 585, 586 (1981).
130. See id. at 585-87; Wright, supra note 80, at 551, 613 n.40. Professor Wright states:
Clearly, the object of much of this large lot zoning . . . is exclusion-exclusion from certain
areas or suburban communities of low, moderate and even middle income people, exclusion of
minorities . . . exclusion of young people who cannot afford to buy into that type of market,
and (probably incidentally) exclusion of older people who either want to or have to live in apart-
ments or condominiums.
Id. at 551.
131. See Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336
A.2d 713, 727-28 (local government may not disregard the impact of the regulation on region as a
whole) appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975); Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc.
439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765, 768-69 (1970); Save A Valuable Environment v. City of Bothell. 89
Wn. 2d 862, 576 P.2d 401, 405-06 (1978). Cf. Beck v. Town of Raymond, 118 N.H. 793, 394
A.2d 847 (1978) (court upheld "parochial growth restriction" as a temporary measure but criticized
local planning efforts that disregard regional concerns).
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emnment seeks to exclude racial minorities or low income groups from the
community. 132 A court might be unable to find the explicit discriminatory
intent required under modem Supreme Court equal protection analysis, 133
but still may decide that the public purpose supporting the regulation is
too weak to survive a balancing test. 134
The second reason justifying stricter scrutiny of local governments is
their status as quasi-administrative entities. 135 Local governments zone
under authority delegated by the state legislature. 136 Local land use deci-
sions are subject to the procedural constraints written into the enabling
statute or implied from procedural due process. 137 Substantive review of
The foundation for stricter scrutiny of local zoning decisions that are made in disregard of regional
concerns was laid in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). Justice Suther-
land upheld the right of local governments to make their own planning decisions, but noted "the
possibility of cases where the general public interest would so far outweigh the interest of the munici-
pality that the municipality would not be allowed to stand in the way." Id. at 390.
132. See Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336
A.2d 713 (equal protection and due process grounds), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S.
808 (1975); Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc. 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970) (zoning having "an
exclusionary purpose or result" is not allowed in Pennsylvania).
133. The United States Supreme Court has essentially foreclosed equal protection challenges to
land use regulations where there is discriminatory effect but no independent evidence of discrimina-
tory intent. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265
(1977). See generally Kolis, supra note 129, at 602-04.
134. Suspicion of exclusionary motives has led several courts to subject minimum lot size regu-
lations to more exacting scrutiny. See, e.g., United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th
Cir. 1974) (zoning measure with discriminatory consequences subject to strict scrutiny); Robert E.
Kurzius, Inc. v. Village of Upper Brookville, 67 A.D.2d 70, 414 N.Y.S.2d 573 (1979) (five-acre
minimum was "improper exercise of police power" when enacted for primary purpose of maintain-
ing village as "citadel of privilege"); National Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597
(1965) (town had duty to accommodate growth). Cf. Steel Hill Dev., Inc. v. Town of Sanbomton,
469 F.2d 956 (1st Cir. 1972) (six-acre minimum zoning with likely exclusionary effect valid as "le-
gitimate stop-gap measure" but not as permanent restriction).
135. The traditional attitude is to treat all local zoning actions as legislative acts entitled to a full
presumption of validity. See, e.g., Construction Industry Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897,
906 (9th Cir. 1975) (if "a legitimate state interest is furthered by the zoning regulation, we must defer
to the legislative act."), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976). There has been a growing trend to recog-
nize that some acts of local zoning authorities are quasi-judicial, administrative decisions. See South-
ern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, 726,
appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975): "[I]t is fundamental and not to be forgotten
that the zoning power is a police power of the state and the local authority is acting only as a delegate
of that power and is restricted in the same manner as the state." See also Fasano v. Board of County
Comm'rs of Washington County, 264 Or. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973) (rezone is quasi-judicial action),
miodified on other grounds, Newberger v. City of Portland, 288 Or. 585, 607 P.2d 723, 725 (1980);
Chrobuck v. Snohomish County, 78 Wn. 2d 884, 480 P.2d 489, 495-96 (1971) (planning commis-
sion's function "partakes of the nature of an administrative, quasi-judicial proceeding"). See gener-
ally 0. BROWDER, R. CUNNINGHAM, J. JULIN & A. SMITH, BASIC PROPERTY LAW 1287-99 (3d ed.
1979).
136. Golden v. Planning Bd. of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 369-70, 285 N.E.2d 291, 296, 334
N.Y.S.2d 138, 145, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972). See generally I A. RATHKOPF, THE
LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 2.02 (4th ed. 1975).
137. 1 A. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 2.02 (4th ed. 1975).
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zoning decisions may be justified as a "hard look" at the administrative
choice. 138 Courts often demand that administrative decisions be ade-
quately explained, rationally based, and responsive to the demands of the
entire community. 139
b. The Planning Preceding the Regulation
Courts tend to scrutinize minimum lot size regulations more closely if
they appear to have been enacted without careful consideration of the
consequences to the individual landowners and to the community. 140 The
traditional requirement that local zoning conform to a comprehensive
plan springs from this perception. 14 1 Some commentators note an "in-
creasing concern on the part of the courts over the failure of some local
governments to base their land use regulations on anything but popular
prejudice." 142 Most courts try to discern the overall reasonableness of the
regulation, and the planning that preceded it is a relevant consideration.
c. The Urgency of the Public Need
Another important factor that courts consider is the urgency of the pub-
lic need for the regulation. Most courts recognize that some public pur-
poses are more pressing than others and assign them different weights in a
balancing process. For instance, maintenance of the aesthetic qualities in
a wealthy suburb and preservation of prime farm soils critical to the econ-
omy of a state are both public purposes that will support regulation. 43
138. See W. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 196 (1977).
139. Id. at 16-21.
140. See, e.g., Steel Hill Dev., Inc. v. Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956, 962 (lst Cir. 1972). Chief
Judge Coffin stated that he was "'disturbed by the admission here that there was never any profes-
sional or scientific study made as to why six, rather than four or eight, acres was reasonable to protect
the values cherished by the people of Sanbornton." The court upheld the challenged restriction as a
"legitimate stop-gap measure," but stated that "'this requirement may well not indefinitely stand
without more homework by the concerned parties." Id.
141. Most state enabling acts require that all zoning be enacted "in accordance with a compre-
hensive plan." See I A. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 12.01 (4th ed. 1975).
Professor Rathkopf emphasizes the connection between the need for planning and the regulation's
ability to survive due process and equal protection challenges.
142. THE TAKING ISSUE, supra note 9, at 235.
143. See. e.g., Home Builders League v. Township of Berlin, 81 N.J. 127, 405 A.2d 381,
390-91 (1979) (conservation of property values is a legitimate zoning purpose). See also Village of
Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). Justice Douglas stated that:
[a] quiet place where yards are wide, people few. and motor vehicles restricted are legitimate
guidelines in a land-use project addressed to family needs .... The police power is not confined
to elimination of filth, stench, and unhealthy places. It is ample to lay out zones where family
values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make the area a sanctuary
for people.
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But most courts recognize that the second objective is more important
than the first.144 Accordingly, a greater burden on the landowner can be
supported when the more important purpose is invoked.
Courts perceive differences in the urgency of the public need for vari-
ous lot size restrictions. There are at least two common types of situations
where lot size regulations provoke constitutional challenges. In the first, a
government imposes one-half to five-acre minimum lot sizes on a devel-
oping residential area to avoid congestion and maintain property
values. 145 In the second, much larger minimums are imposed to preserve
farmlands, wetlands, floodplains, or other environmentally significant
areas. 146 The second type of control generally imposes greater burdens on
the landowner. 147 Nevertheless, it has been generally more successful in
surviving constitutional challenges, due to a perception that the public
need for this type of regulations is also much greater. Two cases from
Illinois illustrate this disparity.
In Duggan v. County of Cook, 148 the Illinois court invalidated 20,000
square foot single family residential zoning because it failed a balancing
test. The court said:
Ultimately if it clearly appears that the relative gain to the public is small
when compared with the hardship imposed upon the property owner by the
zoning restriction, there is then no valid basis for the exercise of the police
power to so limit the owner's right to the use of his property. 149
On the other hand, when the Illinois intermediate court considered 160-
acre exclusive farm use zoning in Wilson v. County of McHenry, 150 it
found that the public need outweighed the burden on the landowner and
upheld the regulation. 151 This was so even though the burden imposed on
Id. at9.
144. The greater weight placed on the preservation of critical farmlands must be inferred from
the results of cases involving either types of restrictions. See notes 148-53 and accompanying text
infra.
145. E.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (one- to five-acre minimum); Hamer
v. Town of Ross, 59 Cal. 2d 776, 382 P.2d 375, 379, 31 Cal. Rptr. 335 (1963) (one acre limitation);
Duggan v. County of Cook, 60 I11. 2d 107, 324 N.E.2d 406, 408-9 (1975) (single family residential
zoning); Appeals of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc. 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765-66 (1970) (two- and three-
acre minimums).
146. E.g., San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v: City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 624-26 (1981)
(open space zoning for wetlands); Wilson v. County of McHenry, 92 Ill. App.3d 997, 416 N.E.2d
426, 427 (1981) (160-acre exclusive farm use zoning); Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201
N.W.2d 716, 764-66 (1972) (wetland regulation).
147. See note 126 and accompanying text supra.
148. 60 I11. 2d 107, 324N.E.2d 406 (1975).
149. 324 N.E.2d at 409.
150. 92111. App. 3d 997, 416 N.E.2d 426 (1981).
151. 416 N.E.2d at 430. The court said: "The unique consideration in agricultural zoning, which
Washington Law Review Vol. 57:715, 1982
the Wilson landowner was much greater than that imposed in Duggan. 152
These results are not unusual. 153 Courts typically uphold regulations that
advance strong public needs unless the result is manifestly unjust to the
landowner.
2. The Extent of the Owner's Loss
The second component of the balancing test that courts consider in de-
termining the constitutionality of minimum lot size restrictions is the bur-
den that the regulation places upon the landowner. 154 Under the Pennsyl-
vania Coal taking test, a court asks whether the regulation goes "too far"
in depriving the owner of the reasonable use and enjoyment of his land. ' 55
Under the substantive due process test, a court asks whether the regula-
tion is "unduly oppressive." 156 The difference between these concepts is
not merely semantic. The substantive due process test explicitly envisions
a balancing element, while the "too far" test is intended to operate as an
absolute check on regulatory power. 157 The concept of "undue oppres-
sion," therefore, is more flexible than the "too far" test. One common
includes the obvious public interest in preserving good farm land, must be balanced against this
consideration of loss in value and profit."
152. The alleged loss in McHenry was $14,000-$16,000 per acre, or 75-80% of the value. 416
N.E.2d at 429. The loss in Duggan was not ascertained, but appears to be considerably less. See 324
N.E.2d at 409-10.
153. Compare, e.g., National Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597, 608 (1965)
(court invalidated four-acre minimums that reduced value of land from $260,000 to $175.000) and
Aronson v. Town of Sharon, 346 Mass. 598, 195 N.E.2d 341 (1964) (court invalidated 100.000
square foot minimum without proof of diminution in value) with American Say. & Loan Ass'n v.
County of Marin, 653 F.2d 364 (1981) (five-acre zoning to preserve coastal spit upheld, despite
allegation that the zoning made that portion of the property useless) and Just v. Marinette County. 56
Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972) (court upheld wetland regulation that allowed owner no profitable
use of land). Injustice to the landowner often occurs when the property is unsuited to the purposes for
which it is zoned. This aspect controlled two cases that considered very large lot agricultural zoning
in Illinois before such zoning was upheld in Wilson v. County of McHenry, 92 111. App. 3d 997. 416
N.E.2d 426 (1981). In these cases the court invalidated the zoning because it concluded that the lands
in question were not suitable for intensive farming. Pettee v. County of DeKalb. 60 I11. App. 3d 304.
376 N.E.2d 720. 725 (1978); Smeja v. County of Boone, 34 111. App. 3d 628. 339 N.E.2d 452. 455
(1975).
154. See note 127 and accompanying text supra.
155. See notes 50, 110-16 and accompanying text supra.
156. See note 16 and accompanying text supra.
157. Professor Stoebuck claims that while "a metaphysician might try to distinguish among 'un-
duly oppressive,' 'too far,' and 'unreasonable.' . . . it is fatuous to suppose a court could formulate
distinctions that would work in resolving actual cases." Stoebuck, supra note 9. at 1082. But there is
an important difference. The "'too far" test provides an independent measure of when a regulation
becomes a taking. The "unduly oppressive" phrase in the substantive due process test, on the other
hand, is an important part of the means analysis. The regulation is only "unduly oppressive" if it
uses means that are more restrictive than necessary to accomplish the purpose.
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variety of lot size restrictions, timed-growth controls, illustrates the need
for this flexibility.
Timed-growth controls have become popular as planners seek ways to
channel development into areas of the community that can best handle
it. 158 Typically, these controls use very large minimum lot sizes to se-
verely restrict development until a specific period of time has lapsed, or
until the requisite public services have been installed. 159 Timed-growth
controls have generally survived both due process and takings chal-
lenges. 160 This result seems consistent with substantive due process, but
more problematic under a strict application of the Pennsylvania Coal test.
Professor Wright has canvassed the cases involving timed-growth con-
trols and has concluded that five basic factors determine whether a court
will approve a plan. 161 First, the controls must follow a careful study de-
tailing the expected population growth, the demand on public services,
and the community's ability to cope with these demands. Second, the
plan must meet the concerns of the study by providing a timetable for
development of public services. Third, a plan must reflect attainable goals
and a real public commitment to achieve these goals. Fourth, there must
be procedures for special treatment of individuals who are uniquely bur-
dened or who wish to provide the necessary public services at their own
expense. Finally, the plan must not be a sham. It must reflect a desire to
accommodate growth in a sensible and orderly fashion, rather than simply
an intent to freeze growth or to divert it to areas beyond the borders of the
community. 162
Taken together, these factors address the reasonableness of the regula-
tion, not whether it constitutes a taking. Under the takings clause, a court
should not consider any of these factors except the fourth. 163 A court ap-
plying the takings test should consider only whether the regulation, at its
time of enactment, has gone "too far" in depriving the owner of the rea-
158. See, e.g., Construction Industry Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1975); Golden v. Planning Bd. of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d
291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972).
159. See Wright, supra note 80, at 557.
160. Id.
161. Id.at 558.
162. Id.
163. This assertion goes against the traditional analysis of regulatory takings cases. It is black
letter law to say that a regulation is only a taking if its effect is permanent. E.g., Golden v. Planning
Bd. of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S.
1003 (1972) (timed growth controls upheld against takings attack); Arveme Bay Constr. Co. v.
Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 232, 15 N.E.2d 587, 592 (1938) ("An ordinance which permanently so
restricts the use of property that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose" is a taking). In Fred F.
French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d 381, 385, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5
(1976), however, the court claimed that both Golden and Arverne Bay used takings language as a
"metaphor" for lack of substantive due process.
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sonable use and enjoyment of her land. 164 The limited duration of the
regulation, inherent in timed-growth controls, should not affect the tak-
ings determination. 165 Temporary takings are a common phenomenon in
other areas of eminent domain.' 66 For instance, in United States v.
Causby, 16 7 the Court held that low level airplane flights over the plain-
tiff's farm constituted a fifth amendment taking. 168 The temporary nature
of the use did not stop the Court from requiring payment for the time that
government had interfered with the owner's property rights. Once it is
conceded that overly restrictive land use regulations are actual takings,
the analogy with the temporary takings cases seems compelling. If the
immediate impact of the regulation sufficiently interferes with the
owner's use and enjoyment, the owner must be compensated. The dura-
tion of the regulation only helps to determine the amount of the ultimate
award.
Unlike the takings test, the substantive due process test allows a court
to consider all the important issues surrounding timed-growth controls. 169
As Professor Wright shows, most courts do in fact look at the total impact
of controls in determining their constitutionality. 70 Because development
is merely delayed and not prohibited by these controls, courts often con-
clude that the timed controls are necessary to an important public pur-
pose, and therefore are not unduly harsh. 171
Application of the substantive due process test seems preferable as a
matter of public policy. The potential range of circumstances surrounding
timed-growth regulations requires that courts use a test that allows them
to balance the urgency of the public's need and the unavailability of less
restrictive alternatives against the landowner's inability to make profit-
able use of the land. Only under the substantive due process test does a
court have the necessary flexibility. It can uphold those timed-growth reg-
ulations that protect the public from the problems attendant upon uncon-
trolled growth while restricting the owner no more than is necessary. Yet
164. See San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting and expressing views of five justices on the merits).
165. Id. at 657: "The fact that a regulatory 'taking' may be temporary does not make it any
less of a constitutional 'taking.' Nothing in the Just Compensation Clause suggests that 'takings'
must be permanent and irrevocable."
166. See Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. I, 6 (1949); United States v. Petty
Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 374-75 (1946); United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373.
374-75 (1945).
167. 328 U.S. 256(1946).
168. Id. at 266. Because flights could be discontinued at any time, the case was remanded for
consideration of the damages. Id. at 268.
169. See part ID supra.
170. Wright, supra note 80, at 557-58.
171. Id.at558-59.
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it can strike those regulations that burden the landowner or surrounding
communities without corresponding benefit to the public.
V. CONCLUSION
The above examples demonstrate the need for a test that takes into ac-
count the variety of circumstances that characterize land use regulations
in this country. A test with but one dimension, such as the one proposed
by Justice Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal, is inadequate. It fails to take
into account the size of the government entity enacting the regulation, the
adequacy of the planning, or the strength of the policy justification. It
validates many regulations that are manifestly unreasonable, simply be-
cause the impact of the regulation on the landowner is not so severe that
the court will find a taking. It discourages government from regulation,
even when there is a grave public need, whenever regulation imposes a
considerable burden on the landowner.
Substantive due process, on the other hand, is superior to the takings
test for most situations in which land use regulations are subjected to con-
stitutional challenges. As demonstrated, substantive due process better
describes the test that the courts already use in these situations. In addi-
tion, its adoption would lead courts to clearer analysis and more sure
identification of appropriate precedents.
This proposal is essentially conservative. If substantive due process is
accepted as the major check on government's power to regulate land,
courts will continue their case-by-case review. Most land use regulations
will be upheld, as they are today. Some regulations, because they appear
to lack a public purpose, rational means or substantive fairness to the
landowner, will be invalidated. The courts will continue to consider and
balance several factors to determine whether a given regulation is consti-
tutional. The status quo will reign.
Then why change from the takings label for the balancing test that most
courts use? First and foremost is the need to avoid the notion that land use
regulations necessarily require compensation. The possibility of damage
payments- for regulatory takings threatens to chill the ability of public en-
tities to plan land uses. With dwindling budgets and burgeoning demands
on the public treasury, even the inchoate threat of compensation for land
use takings could doom efforts to bring innovative techniques and sound
environmental planning to our communities. The second reason is more
subtle. As demonstrated, both tests have been used in ways that allow the
courts the greatest amount of latitude to consider the regulation in its so-
cial context. Nevertheless, only substantive due process can achieve this
flexibility without sacrificing doctrinal consistency. The takings test sim-
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ply was designed for another task. Pressed into service in the area of land
use controls, the carefully developed concepts of eminent domain become
excess theoretical baggage. A court using the takings test in this area is
forced into a dilemma between selectively ignoring the doctrinal founda-
tions of the test, or accepting these foundations and being led to unfortu-
nate results.
Substantive due process, properly understood, eliminates the need for
an expansive takings test. It meets the concerns that caused courts to en-
large the takings test beyond its original contours without the doctrinal
inconsistencies that bedevil that effort. Substantive due process allows
case-by-case flexibility with a doctrinal structure that is largely missing
from the modem regulatory takings cases.
If this approach were accepted, courts might treat the takings test in
either of two ways. First, the Pennsylvania Coal test could survive as a
secondary approach, reserved solely for those situations where the regula-
tion completely deprives the owner of any profitable use.172 In these
cases, the test could function as a "safety net" to prevent the owner's
interests from being entirely balanced away under the substantive due
process test. This preserves the rationale of the Pennsylvania Coal deci-
sion while providing an objective measure for when a regulation goes
"too far." Second, courts could reject the concept of regulatory takings
entirely, leaving scrutiny of land use regulations to substantive due pro-
cess. Either result would improve our understanding of the test and
remedies for unconstitutional land use regulations.
Ross A. Macfarlane
172. Many courts that use the PennsYlvania Coal test state that a regulation will not become a
taking unless "'the property has been rendered worthless or useless." Smoke Rise Inc. v. Washington
Suburban Sanitary Comm., 400 F. Supp. 1369, 1382 (D. Md. 1975). See also Steel Hill Dev.. Inc.
v. Town of Sanbomton, 469 F.2d 956, 963 (Ist Cir. 1972): Sibson v. State. I I l N.H. 305. 282 A.2d
664(1971).
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